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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION  
 
Background  
 
Patterns of forced migration in Burma (Myanmar1) have been structured by the changing 
nature of conflict in the country. Since independence in 1948, Burma has been subject to 
armed conflict, in the form of a communist insurgency – which came close to seizing state 
power in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Taylor 1987) – and a series of inter-linked ethnic 
rebellions (Smith 1999). Following a turbulent decade of parliamentary politics, the Burma 
Army (or Tatmadaw) temporarily assumed state power between 1958–60, before 
consolidating its control, following a coup d’etat in 1962 (Callahan 2003). Since the 1960s, 
above-ground politics and state-society relations in Burma have been dominated by the 
military, in the form of a state-socialist polity (1962–88: Taylor 1987) and – since the 
military coup of September 1988 – in a more market-oriented, but still highly authoritarian 
form of military rule (South 2005).  
 
In 1989 the once-powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB) collapsed, allowing the 
Tatmadaw to concentrate its forces on the ethnic insurgencies, which by this time were 
mostly confined to the northern and eastern border areas. Between 1989-95, some two dozen 
ceasefires were agreed between the military regime, and the majority of armed ethnic groups 
(Smith 1999, South 2005).  
 
By 2007, only two significant insurgent organizations remained at war with the regime in 
Yangon (Rangoon). However, more than two million people of Burmese origin were still 
displaced outside the country, including more than 150,000 refugees in Thailand, the first of 
whom had sought shelter in the kingdom in the mid-1980s (Lang 2002, TBBC July 2006). In 
addition, over half a million people remained internally displaced within Burma (HRW 2005, 
TBBC November 2006).  
 
Introduction 
The shifting nature of conflict in Burma over the past fifteen years has structured a range of 
inter-linked displacement crises. In this paper, three main types of forced migration in – and 
from – the country are identified: Type 1 – armed-conflict-induced displacement; Type 2 – 
State/society-induced displacement; and Type 3 – livelihood/vulnerability-induced 
displacement. Each is addressed in a case study, with material drawn from different 
geographic areas, illustrating different aspects and impacts of (armed and state-society) 
conflict in Burma. 
 
This paper shows that internal displacement in Burma is not only caused by armed conflict in 
the insurgent-prone eastern borderlands. While the most acutely vulnerable internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) do live in those few areas of the country still affected by significant 
                                                
 
1
 In June 1989 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military regimere-named the country 
Myanmar Naing-ngan. Opposition politicians and activists dispute the legitimacy of the military regime, and 
reject the new name. This paper follows the majority of English language commentators in retaining ‘Burma’. 

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levels of armed conflict, the phenomenon of forced migration is more complex and 
widespread – the product of decades of mis-governance by the militarized state.2 
 
The paper is based on more than two hundred interviews and focus groups, conducted 
between 2001-06 in Kachin, Karen, Mon and Shan States, in Tenasserim and Yangon 
Divisions, and along the Thailand and China borders. Informants included: different 
categories of migrants (including IDPs and refugees) from various ethnic, social and gender 
groups; ‘host communities’; previously displaced communities which have found solutions to 
their plight; political organisations; armed ethnic groups (with and without ceasefires); local 
NGOs and CBOs; UN agencies, the ICRC, and INGOs; diplomats, academics and journalists. 
Secondary material comes from a survey of published (including electronic) sources and 
limited circulation (‘grey’) literature. 
 
Access, Enquiry and Data 
Most research and publications on forced migration in Burma (e.g. Amnesty International 
2002; Burma Ethnic Research Group 1998, 2000; Burma Issues 2003; Christian Aid 2004; 
Cusano, in Vincent & Brigitte Refslund 2001; Grundy-Warr & Yin 2003; Heppner 2005; 
Humanitarian Affairs Research Project 2003; Human Rights Watch 2005; Shan Human 
Rights Foundation 2003; Thailand-Burma Border Consortium 2004, 2005, 2006) have a 
strong human rights orientation, focusing on armed conflict and its impacts in the eastern 
border zones. Such approaches are obviously important given the widespread violations 
involved. However this concentration on parts of eastern Burma accessible to agencies 
working cross-border from Thailand has tended to obscure assessments of forced migration 
in Burma as a whole. Much less is known about the situations in other geographic areas, or 
about displaced populations not accessible to the armed opposition groups with which cross-
border aid agencies cooperate. One consequence has been a lack of data and analysis on 
military occupation- and ‘development’-induced displacement, or on livelihoods 
vulnerability-induced displacement (exceptions include Hudson-Rodd, Myo Nyunt, Saw 
Thamain Tun & Sein Htay 2003; Human Rights Foundation of Monland 2003; Lambrecht 
2004). 
 
In general the literature on the political economy of conflict and displacement in Burma is 
rather sparse (primarily, Sherman 2003). Those investigating forced migration in Burma 
generally hold strong views regarding the promotion of socio-political change in the country. 
These agendas have shaped the types of inquiry undertaken and the questions asked, and thus 
the nature of the reality ‘uncovered’ by research (see for example, the material included in 
the Global IDP Database Burma Profile). However, such approaches tend to stop short of 
focusing attention on certain trends which have emerged in some previously armed conflict-
affected areas, over the past decade.  
 
This paper attempts to redress the balance of existing research, by addressing issues of forced 
migration in non-armed conflict affected areas of Burma, including parts of the country not 
readily accessible from the Thailand border. It incorporates rights-based perspectives and 
also describes how people attempt to rehabilitate their lives and communities, under the most 
difficult of circumstances. The paper identifies new forms of forced migration, which have 
                                                
2
 On the development of the military-dominated state in Burma, see Robert Taylor (1987) and Mary Callahan 
(2003).  
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emerged with the existence of ceasefires in many previously armed conflict-affected areas, 
especially in northern Burma. It can be expected that such new patterns of internal migration 
will emerge in areas currently affected by armed conflict, if/when insurgency comes to an 
end along the Thailand border. Indeed, patterns of development-induced displacement have 
emerged in parts of southeast Burma since the 1990s (see below). A better understanding of 
the issues in areas no longer affected by armed conflict-affected should help to prepare local 
and international actors for future developments in areas currently beset by the state’s often 
brutal counter-insurgent operations.  
 
Displacement Figures 
This paper focuses primarily on the situation of IDPs and other forced migrants in Burma. 
However, some preliminary notes are required regarding the situation of refugees from 
Burma, in neighbouring countries. 3 
 
Western Border: The Rohingya Muslim minority have long been discriminated against, and 
are denied Burmese citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law. Following a brutal 
Tatmadaw campaign in 1991–92 (including massive forced labour and other human rights 
abuses), some 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh as refugees. Most were repatriated by 
UNHCR in mid-late 1990s; about 28,000 remain in refugee camps around Cox’s Bazaar. The 
UN and other international agencies have struggled to protect Rohingya returnees from 
further rounds of abuse. The Rohingyas “continue to suffer from multiple restrictions and 
human rights violations … [including] forced eviction and house destruction; land 
confiscation and various forms of extortion and arbitrary taxation including financial 
restrictions on marriage. Rohingyas continue to be used as forced laborers on roads and at 
military camps… In addition, the vast majority of are effectively denied Myanmar 
citizenship, rendering them stateless” (Amnesty International 2004). 
 
Eastern Border: In Thailand, the first semi-permanent Karen refugee camps were 
established in the area north of Mae Sot, halfway up the Thailand-Burma border, in the early 
1980s (Lang 2002; South 2005, Chapter 12). Since 1984, these camps have been supplied 
with food (and, more recently, shelter and a range of other necessities) by a consortium of 
INGOs, currently named the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC). The refugees 
health needs are addressed by a handful of medical agencies; since the late 1990s, a number 
of INGOs have been active in the border camps in the field of education.  
 
By 2005, about US$30 million a year was being channelled through Thailand-based 
organizations supporting displaced people in and from Burma4. Most assistance was provided 
to about 140,000 (Karen and Karenni) refugees in a dozen camps along the border, while 
some $2.5 million went to IDPs. Two years later, the number of refugees in Thailand had 
grown to 152,245 (TBBC January 2007). 
 
IDP Population Estimates: The subject of IDP numbers is problematic. Counting only 
people who have been forcibly displaced since 2004, the number of IDPs in eastern Burma 
will probably be no more than 100,000 people. However, the number of previously displaced 
                                                
3
 For more on Burmese refugees, see South (2005), TBBC (July 2006), and Lang (2002).  
4
 This figure represents a little less than half the total amount of foreign aid dispersed to the entire (estimated) 
fifty-five million population living in government-controlled ‘Myanmar’. 
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people for whom no durable solution has been found must be calculated in the millions, 
including vulnerable communities that have been living in displacement for decades.  
 
Since 1996, 3,077 villages are known to have been destroyed (usually burnt) and/or relocated 
en masse, or otherwise abandoned, due to Tatmadaw activity, including at least 232 villages 
between 2005-06 alone (TBBC November 2006). While unknown numbers of these villages 
have since re-settled (either in situ, or at a nearby location), most remain de-populated.  
 
According to the TBBC and its local partner groups, there were a total of 500,000 IDPs in 
eastern Burma in mid/late-2006. These include 287,000 people in ceasefire areas, 95,000 in 
areas directly affected by armed conflict, and 118,000 people in government-controlled 
relocation sites. These figures do not include Type 1 IDPs who have not made themselves 
available to armed opposition groups, or large numbers of people who have achieved (at least 
semi-) durable solutions to their plight, especially those living in peri-urban areas. It also 
does not include hundreds of thousands of Types 2 (state/society-induced) and Type 3 
(livelihood/vulnerability-induced) IDPs, in other parts of Burma, especially Kachin and Shan 
States and the west of the country. These figures are likely to have increased in 2006, due to 
large-scale Tatmadaw operations in northern Karen State, during the first half of 2006 (see 
below). 
 
TABLE 1 – Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons in 2005 and 2006  
(TBBC November 2006) 
 
 

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Long-term Patterns of Displacement: Most studies of forced migration in and from Burma 
(cited above) focus on peoples’ often traumatic experiences, occurring over a relatively short 
period of time. While important from a rights-based perspective, this approach tends to 
obscure longer-term patterns of displacement.  
 
Armed conflict-induced displacement (Type 1) often occurs among communities which 
periodically shift their location for socio-cultural reasons and to access agricultural land 
(Cusano, in Vincent & Sorensen 2001; HRW 2005). However, the scale of displacement in 
Karen and other areas over the past fifty years has been out of all proportion to any 
traditional patterns of migration.  
 
Furthermore, forced migration among significant segments of the Karen and other ethnic 
nationality communities is not a ‘one-off’ phenomenon. It is rarely the case that an 
individual, family or community used to live in ‘Place A’, fled to ‘Place B’ (as an IDP, or as 
a refugee to Thailand), and can thus return in a simple manner to ‘Place A’. The original 
‘Place A’ may have been occupied by the Tatmadaw or other hostile groups, and/or re-settled 
by other displaced people, and/or planted with landmines. Thus it is not unlikely that ‘Place 
A’ is in fact a multitude of ‘Places A – N’.  
 
In-depth interviews, conducted in 2003–04 with a group of 36 Karen IDPs in the Papun hills, 
reveal that these people had experienced more than 1,000 migration episodes.5 Five had been 
forcibly displaced more than 100 times, sometimes dating back to the 1940s. For example 
one old woman first fled to the jungle during WWII, when Japanese soldiers came to her 
village. The great majority of migration episodes were undertaken as a direct result of 
fighting, because of severe human rights abuse (including forced labour), or because armed 
conflict had directly undermined sustainable forms of agriculture. 
 
Terminology and Typology  
In this paper, forced migration is conceptualized as a sub-set of population movements in 
general and ‘internal displacement’ is a sub-set of forced migration. The Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (UNCHR 1998) define internally displaced persons (IDPs) as: 
 
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes 
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. 
 
The case studies identify three ‘ideal types’ within the spectrum of forced migration in 
Burma. These Types are defined according to the root causes of population movement: 
 
Type 1: Armed-Conflict-Induced Displacement having emerged either as a direct 
consequence of fighting and counter-insurgency operations, or because armed conflict 
has directly undermined human and food security. Linked to severe human rights 
abuses across Karen State, in eastern Tenasserim Division, southern Mon State, 
southern and eastern Karenni State, southern Shan State, and parts of Chin State and 
                                                
5
 Documented by the author, for Human Rights Watch (2005).  
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Sagaing Division. A fair amount of quantitative data is available for Type 1 IDPs in 
eastern Burma. 
 
Type 2: State-Society Conflict-Induced Displacement (generally, post-armed conflict; due to 
military occupation and/or ‘development’ activities) having resulted from: land 
confiscation by the Tatmadaw or other armed groups, including in the context of 
natural resource extraction (e.g. logging and mining); infrastructure construction, and 
other forms of large-scale ‘development’ (e.g. roads, bridges, airports); and also as a 
product of predatory taxation, forced labour and other abuses. This form of 
displacement is related to the use of force, but does not occur in the context of 
outright armed conflict. All of the border states and divisions are affected by 
militarization- and/or ‘development’-induced displacement, including Arakan 
(Rakhine) and Kachin States, as well as a number of urban areas. 
 
In this typology, Types 1 and 2 forced migrants are ‘IDPs’ whose displacement is a product 
of conflict. Type 1 is directly caused by armed conflict, whereas Type 2 is caused by latent 
conflict or the threat of the use of force. 
 
Type 3: Livelihoods/Vulnerability-Induced Displacement having emerged as result of 
inappropriate government policies and practices, limited availability of productive 
land, and poor access to markets, resulting in food insecurity; lack of education and 
health services; plus stresses associated with the transition to a cash economy. 
Livelihoods/vulnerability-induced displacement occurs across the country, especially 
in and from remote townships. It represents the primary form of internal and external 
migration in and from Burma (and many other developing countries).  
 
Here, Type 3 population movements describe a particularly vulnerable sub-group of 
economic migrants subject to limited choices. As such, they constitute a form of forced 
migration (or ‘distress migration’). Migration due to opium eradication policies is included 
under Type 3 because the proximate causes of movement are related to livelihoods issues, 
that is – with the important exception of some Wa areas – people are not ordered to move. 
However, opium eradication-induced migration could also be considered under Type 2 
forced migration, due to the forcible nature of the opium bans, the severe shock to 
livelihoods involved, and the links to state-sponsored development activities.  
 
Table 2 – Typology of Forced Migration  
 
FORCED MIGRANTS 
Internally Displaced Persons Other Forced Migrants 
Type 1 
Armed conflict-
induced 
Type 2 
State-society conflict-induced 
(post-armed conflict) 
Type 3 
Livelihoods vulnerability-induced 
(‘distress migration’) 
Case Study: 
Karen State 
Case Studies: 
Kachin and Mon States and 
urban displacement 
Case Study: 
Opium Eradication in Kokang 

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There are important linkages between these three types of displacement, each of which 
undermines traditional livelihoods options. Type 1 characterizes zones of on-going armed 
conflict, and some adjacent areas; Type 2 is particularly prevalent in remote and 
underdeveloped conflict-affected areas, where ceasefires have been agreed between the 
government and armed groups, and also affects many of those relocated to urban areas; Type 
3 is characteristic of remote areas in general, particularly those where armed conflict has 
ceased. No strictly linear progression of displacement from Type 1, to Type 2, to Type 
3should be assumed here, many people are in cyclic transit between different phases of 
displacement, and may be categorized in different ways at different times.  
 
Forced Migration in and from Burma: For many Burmese citizens patterns of migration 
are often cyclic and involve periods spent as (legal or otherwise) labourers in other countries, 
and/or more extended periods as (official or otherwise) refugees in neighbouring countries.6 
The causes and other aspects of population movements within Burma (internal migration) 
and beyond its borders (external migration) are closely linked – and often relate to serious 
and systematic abuses of a range of basic rights. Less clear is how these inter-related 
phenomenon should be conceptualized, in terms of vulnerabilities and needs, and solutions. 
Issues of IDP rehabilitation (in situ or in the context of resettlement), and its relationship to 
refugee repatriation are particularly problematic. A number of local and international 
agencies on both sides of the eastern border are working on these issues, but such approaches 
currently lack coherence or coordination. This paper focuses primarily on internal migration 
in Burma, except where external migration issues are directly relevant to population 
movement within the country.  
 
 
CASE STUDY 1: KAREN STATE  
 
Type 1: Armed-Conflict-Induced Displacement 
For over half a century, life across much of rural Burma has been profoundly affected by 
armed conflict.7 In many ethnic minority-populated areas, repeated incidents of forced 
displacement – interspersed with occasional periods of relative stability – have been a fact of 
life for generations.  
 
Karen Nationalism and Insurgency, and State Counter-insurgency.  
The Karen community consists of a diverse collection of ethno-linguistic groups, which 
nevertheless share a number of common characteristics. At least two-thirds of the 5–7 million 
Karen in Burma are Buddhists.  
 
Conceptions of ethnic identity in contemporary Burma are rooted in the pre-colonial past 
(South 2005) and in the often traumatic colonial experience (Thant 2001). The Karen ethno-
nationalist movement emerged during the British colonial period, when Christian Karen 
                                                
6
 According to the International Organization for Migration, there are about three million migrant workers and 
their dependents in Thailand, most of them from Burma (plus hundreds of thousands in Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Singapore). These people often endure very poor social and working conditions; see Amnesty International 
(June 2005).  
7
 For comprehensive accounts of armed conflict in Burma, see Martin Smith (1999) and South (2005). 
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elites first began to express the idea of a Karen nation, including all elements of the diverse 
socio-linguistic community. The Karen National Union (KNU), which went underground in 
January 1949 (a year after independence), was from the outset led by educated Christian 
elites – in the name of all Karen. The insurgency was at first conceived of a means of 
protecting Karen villagers from attacks by Burman-dominated militias, as well as achieving a 
more-or-less independent Karen State, covering much of lower Burma. Over successive 
years, the rebellion continued as a response to the repressive policies of successive 
governments in Yangon, and the perceived ‘Burmanisation’ of the state (Smith 1999). 
 
In the decade after 1962, when General Ne Win’s Tatmadaw took control of the country, the 
KNU and other ethnic insurgent groups received new injections of recruits from government-
controlled Burma. Ne Win’s disastrous ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ also provided the 
insurgents with new sources of funds, as the economy collapsed, and became dependant on 
smuggled goods – most of which came from neighbouring Thailand. The KNU and other 
armed ethnic groups taxed the black market trade, allowing several rebel leaders to prosper, 
and build up well-equipped armies.  
 
During the ‘cold war’, the KNU and other anti-communist groups also received covert 
support from the Thai national security establishment, allowing them to administer 
substantial ‘liberated zones’ along the 2,000-plus km border, where they served as a useful 
buffer between communist insurgents in Thailand, and the powerful CPB. The KNU and 
other insurgent ‘liberated zones’ took on some of the characteristics of de facto states, with 
military and parallel civilian administrations, and health and education systems.  
 
This period saw the emergence of significant economic agendas in the prosecution of armed 
conflict in Burma (South 2005, Chapter 8). These are epitomized by rise of the KNU’s 
General Saw Bo Mya, a tough field commander, staunch Christian and anti-communist, who 
became a key asset in Thai and US strategy in the region. Like most ethnic insurgent groups, 
the KNU has claimed to be fighting for democracy in Burma – especially since the 1988 
‘democracy uprising’. This position has been reflected in a series of alliances struck with 
pan- Burma opposition groups which fled to the border areas following the events of 1988 
and 1990. However, the democratic ideal has not always been honoured in practice, and the 
‘liberated zones’ have often been characterized by a top-down tributary political system, 
aspects of which recall pre-colonial forms of socio-political organization. Whilst General Bo 
Mya et al have certainly been inspired in their conflict with the central government by 
genuine and strongly-held grievances, many insurgent commanders and their families have 
also benefited financially from protracted armed conflict in Burma – especially from the 
taxation of ‘black market’ trade, and from natural resource extraction (in the case of the 
KNU, logging and mining activities (South 2005)). 
 
Under General Bo Mya, S’ghaw-speaking elites from the lowlands began to unify – and 
dominate – Karen society in the eastern hills. This ‘internal colonization’ had unforeseen 
consequences in the years to come, as an underclass of (mostly Buddhist) subalterns came to 
resent the domination of an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian alien elite. The eventual 
result was rebellion, and the formation of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) – 
see below. 
 
During the early 1980s government forces gained a decisive upper hand in the civil war, and 
the first semi-permanent Karen refugee camps were established in Thailand, as civilians (and 

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rebel soldiers) fled Tatmadaw offensives along the border. By 1994, with the fall of their 
headquarters at Mannerplaw, the KNU was in serious trouble (and the semi-official refugee 
caseload in Thailand stood at 77,107).8 The crisis was compounded by the loss of most of the 
remaining Karen ‘liberated zones’ (in southern Karen State and Tennasserim Division) 
during a major dry season Tatmadaw offensive in 1997 (by the end of which year the refuge 
caseload was 116,264). 
 
The KNU today is a greatly weakened force, and no longer represents a significant military 
threat to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The Karen National Liberation 
Army (KNLA) still has some 5–7,000 soldiers, deployed in seven Brigades (including mobile 
battalions and village militia), and well over a thousand active political cadres (including 
youth and women’s wings). However, at any one time about half of these personnel are 
located among the more than 152,245 refugees living in 10 camps (7 Karen, 2 Karenni, 1 
Shan) in Thailand (TBBC January 2007).9 
 
Although the KNU is in danger of becoming marginalized – both on the Burmese political 
stage, and as an arbiter of Karen affairs – its continuing symbolic importance cannot be 
denied. The KNU is the oldest – and to many Karen people and Burma-watchers, the only 
legitimate – Karen ethno-nationalist group. Having fought for independence (later, 
autonomy) from Yangon since 1949, and not having followed other armed ethnic groups into 
the ceasefire movement, the KNU retains a strong credibility among the wider Burma 
opposition (members of which often accuse the ceasefire groups of having ‘sold out’).  
 
Nevertheless, the emergence of the DKBA constituted a massive upheaval within the Karen 
nationalist movement. The repercussions of this largely self-inflicted disaster are felt to this 
day. These disputes arose out of years of neglect of the Buddhist (and Pwo dialect speaking) 
Karen majority by elements within the Christian (and S’ghaw-speaking) KNU elite. 
Underlying resentment among KNLA foot-soldiers – together with strains generated by the 
decades-long civil war – came to a head in late 1994, when a group of disaffected Buddhist 
Karen soldiers deserted their front-line positions, and swore allegiance to U Thuzana, an 
ambitious Karen monk from ‘inside’ Burma.  
 
The KNU leadership at Mannerplaw failed to deal with the situation effectively, and in 
December 2004 the rebels established the DKBA, consolidating a major split in the Karen 
insurgent ranks. From the outset, the DKBA received military and logistical support from 
local Tatmadaw units, and government agents played a role in stirring up disaffection from 
the early stages of the rebellion. However, the emergence of the DKBA, at a time of great 
crisis in the Karen nationalist movement, was a result of genuine grievances within the 
Buddhist community, combined with poor political skills at the top of the KNU. 
 
The DKBA often acts as a proxy militia army for the Tatmadaw, deflecting some (domestic 
and international) criticism for the state’s harsh policies. Like the Tatmadaw, it uses 
displacement as a means of controlling populations and resources, and to undermine the 
KNU – its main rival for leadership of the Karen community in Burma.  
 
                                                
8
 South (2005), Table Two. 
9
 The ‘Mon returnee’ population was reported at 12,017 people, making a total border caseload of 164,262. 
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Like some of their counterparts in the KNLA, many DKBA commanders and soldiers must 
be considered ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, for whom the military-political status quo is a means 
to personal power (and often personal enrichment). Although some DKBA leaders deploy 
strong ethno-nationalist rhetoric, and appear concerned for the political emancipation and 
socio-economic development of ‘their’ people, the organization resembles a loosely-
structured warlord enterprise, focused on revenue collection (including through 
amphetamines trafficking), and the settling of personal scores. Nevertheless, recent research 
indicates that that conditions for IDPs in ceasefire areas – including presumably DKBA-
controlled zones – are better than those in zones of on-going armed conflict, or the range of 
government-controlled relocation sites (see below). 
 
The DKBA command-and-control structure is extremely weak, and many of these units 
enjoy almost complete autonomy, and/or answer to local Tatmadaw commanders. DKBA 
troop strength is difficult to gauge. Informed sources suggest that the number of active 
soldiers is about 3-4,000, including civilian officials, of whom there are relatively few (the 
DKBA being primarily a warlord-type militia). There are a number of Christians within the 
ranks of the DKBA, including some ranking commanders.  
 
‘Greed and Grievance’ 
 After more than half a century, armed conflict in Burma has become institutionalized, and 
associated with deep-rooted political economies (Jelsma, Kramer and Vervest 2005; Smith 
1999; South 2005). Commanders on both sides of the ‘front lines’ (including those which 
have agreed ceasefires with the government: see below) often rely on the taxation of ‘black 
market’ goods, extraction of natural resources (logging and mining), and other un-regulated 
practices (including the drugs trade) to enrich themselves and their retinues, and to support 
the armed groups, control over which brings the power to extract further ‘tribute’ and 
political power.  
 
The prevalence of such ‘greed-based’ models of conflict worldwide tends to provoke 
scepticism of elite claims to represent ethnic communities. This is especially the case among 
international agencies and observers with experience of armed conflict and its impacts in 
other parts of the world, who tend to focus on ‘greed’ models, and the political economy of 
conflict in Burma. However, such perspectives under-appreciate the often-contested 
legitimacy of many insurgent and ceasefire groups and underestimate the levels of support 
they enjoy in ‘their’ constituencies. In contrast, opposition supporters – especially those 
based outside Burma – tend to emphasize the struggle against a repressive regime and 
‘justice/ legitimate grievance’ models of conflict. They are often uncritically supportive of 
elite-generated ethno-nationalist agendas, without questioning whose interests they serve.  
 
Armed Conflict and Displacement: The ‘Four Cuts’.  
Burma’s ethnic insurgent groups have positioned themselves as the defenders of minority 
populations, against the aggression of state forces. They have adopted guerrilla-style tactics, 
which have invited retaliation against the civilian population – but against which the armed 
groups have been unable to defend villagers. Since the 1960s – in response to protracted 
insurgencies in most ethnic nationality-populated areas – state forces have pursued often 
brutal counter-insurgency strategies, including the forced relocation of civilian populations 
deemed sympathetic to armed ethnic and communist groups (Taylor 1985).  
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The KNU and other insurgent groups have an interest in controlling, or at least maintaining, 
civilian populations in traditionally Karen lands – as a source of legitimacy, and of food, 
intelligence and soldiers, porters etc. Therefore, KNU cadres regularly organize village 
evacuations, to ‘protect’ villagers from Tatmadaw incursions (a service which is appreciated 
by many IDPs).  
 
Clearly, the KNU and other insurgent organizations bear some responsibility for the plight of 
civilians in areas where they operate. For nearly 60 years, they have pursued an armed 
conflict against the central government, although the possibility of any military victory 
probably disappeared during the 1970s (or at the latest, after the fall of the last KNU 
‘liberated zones’, in the mid-1990s). 
 
Such complexities notwithstanding, most forms of forced displacement – and associated 
serious human rights abuses – still occur in the context of the Tatmadaw’s ‘Four Cuts’ 
counter-insurgency strategy (and more recently, as a result of the activities government-
aligned militias). Having issued orders to relocate to areas firmly under state control, 
Tatmadaw columns often return to remote areas which have been ‘cleared’, to ensure that 
they are not re-settled (which they often are): many villages are therefore ‘serially displaced’. 
 
Armed conflict and counter-insurgency operations in rural Burma have severely disrupted 
traditional ways of life. Most of the rural and peri-urban population of eastern Burma has 
been displaced or otherwise affected at some point during the last fifty years (although in 
many areas, such as the Pegu Yomas, armed conflict and forced displacement are memories 
of the 1960s). Since the late 1980s, several hundred thousand IDPs have been forced to flee 
their homes and live under particularly difficult conditions in zones of on-going armed 
conflict, or government-controlled relocation sites (for population estimates, see below). 
While some of these people have achieved a level of stability in their new settlements, many 
have yet to find ‘durable solutions’ to their plight.  
 
The KNU Ceasefire: Pockets of Relative Stability, Amidst Continuing Armed Conflict 
Following an aborted series of meetings in the mid-1990s, ceasefire negotiations between the 
SPDC and KNU commenced in December 2003, with the announcement of a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ to cease fighting. Although substantial talks began in January the following year, 
the purge of the relatively progressive prime minister (and Military Intelligence (MI) chief), 
General Khin Nyunt, in October 2004, presented a serious set-back to the peace process.  
 
If the provisional KNU-SPDC ceasefire can be consolidated, it may yet deliver a substantial 
improvement in the human rights situation on the ground, creating the space in which local 
and international organizations can begin to address the urgent needs of a war-ravaged 
population. However, developments since mid-2005 indicate that the government lacks the 
political will to make peace. Across much of northern Karen State, the situation remains dire, 
with the Tatmadaw launching major operations against a diminished KNU insurgency.  
 
Between February 2006 and January 2007, approximately 25,000 people were displaced by 
Tatmadaw attacks on villages in northwest Karen State (Toungoo, Nyaunglebin and Papun 
Districts), where the Tatmadaw has responded aggressively to provocation by the KNLA’s 
Second Brigade. Of these, some 5,000 have crossed the border, to seek refuge in Thailand. 
(Free Burma Rangers, 3-2-2007).  
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Recent Tatmadaw offensives in Karen areas seem designed – in part, at least – to gain control 
over previously contested areas, in order to undertake major infrastructure developments – 
such as the construction of a series of hydroelectric dams on the Salween River. If built, at an 
estimated cost of about over $5 billion, the dams will flood an estimated 995 Km sq. of 
forest.  
 
In November 2004 a coalition of Karen NGOs reported that three-quarters of the 85 villages 
in the vicinity of the planned dam sites had been forcibly relocated, since 1995, displacing 
tens of thousands of civilians. According to Karen Rivers Watch (KRW, p. 49), “the regime 
is using ‘development’ to justify its subjugation and militarization of the ethnic-controlled 
areas … and mask the root causes of civil war in Burma.” It seems therefore, that the nature 
armed conflict is changing, in those parts of Burma where civil war has not come to an end. 
This finding may challenge the distinction, presented in this paper, between Types 1 and 2 
forced migration: the fundamental causes of displacement for many new IDPs in Karen (and 
Karenni and Shan10) areas are related to proposed new development projects.11 Nevertheless, 
the proximate causes of these peoples’ plight remains armed conflict, and related abuses and 
deprivations. These disturbing developments notwithstanding, since the provisional KNU 
ceasefire, the situation in other Karen areas has begun to stabilize. In parts of Tenasserim 
Division, and across much of central and southern Karen State, there is less fighting and 
somewhat fewer human rights violations than before.  
 
Changing Patterns of Displacement and Rehabilitation 
Since 2004, and the (provisional) KNU ceasefire, in some parts of Karen State, Type 1 IDPs 
have begun to return ‘spontaneously’ from hiding places in the jungle (and from relocation 
sites, and some refugee camps in Thailand), to build more permanent (wooden) houses and 
grow crops other than swidden rice. Especially in central and southern Karen State, many 
IDPs have moved from ceasefire zones into relatively more secure villages and peri-urban 
areas, influenced by both the government and armed groups (the KNU controls no ‘ceasefire 
zones’).  
 
The total number of IDPs in Karen areas (eastern Pegu Division, Karen State and Tenasserim 
Division) recorded by the TBBC and partner groups in 2005 was 179,800 people, compared 
to about 190,400 in 2004 (TBBC October 2005). These changes reflected a decrease in the 
number of IDPs in hiding, relocation sites and ceasefire areas, since the KNU ceasefire.  
 
As noted above, upon receiving relocation orders, or becoming subject to other forced 
migration pressures, some people enter relocation sites, while others go into ‘hiding in the 
jungle’, or move to other villages (including in ceasefire zones), and/or urban and peri-urban 
areas. Most relocation sites seem to disperse within a few years of their establishment, as the 
authorities ‘turn a blind eye’ to forcibly relocated communities’ efforts to return to their 
original land, or re-settle elsewhere. In many cases however conditions in relocation sites 
return to normalcy over time (by the standards of rural Burma), as people rebuild their 
                                                
10
 Between 1996-98, villagers in the vicinity of the proposed Tasang Dam, in central/southern Shan State, were 
subject to extensive and well-documented bouts of forced relocation; about 300,000 people (56,000 families) 
were forced to move to relocation sites, or to flee (Shan Human Rights Foundation 2003). Further rounds of 
forced relocation were reported in these areas, in 2005-06. 
11
 Similar patterns emerged in the 1990s, when Mon and Karen civilians were forcibly displaced, prior to the 
construction of the Yadana Gas Pipeline between Burma and Thailand: South (2005, Chapter 13). 
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communities in the new location, often in partnership with CBOs and local NGOs. In such 
cases, residents may prefer life in the ‘new village’, to the uncertainties of return or 
resettlement elsewhere (and the possibility of being subject to a new round of displacement, 
in the future). Such rehabilitated relocation sites may offer better health and education 
services, and access to markets etc., than the remote village which people were originally 
forced to vacate.  
 
In such cases the label ‘relocation site’ is not particularly helpful. Certainly, people’s 
vulnerabilities and needs – and the options for outside intervention – will be different to 
those of people in ‘classic’ relocation sites. Thus the importance of a community-based 
approach to needs analysis, which takes account of local responses to displacement. These 
distinctions also indicate that for many displaced people, rehabilitation in situ (a form of 
‘spontaneous rehabilitation’) will be a preferred durable solution. In this paper, such 
rehabilitated communities have been included under the rubric of ‘Relatively More Secure 
Villages and Peri-urban Areas’.  
 
These comments notwithstanding, many villagers remain ready to flee at short notice, and 
still often spend a night under the stars, if a Tatmadaw patrol approaches the village. 
Furthermore, many armed conflict-affected (especially border) areas remain heavily 
landmined – with important implications on any future refugee/IDP repatriation/ 
rehabilitation activities. 
 
Type 1: Responses and Impacts 
Type 1 forced migrants’ vulnerabilities – and consequent needs – vary according to their 
response to displacement pressures. For example, given orders to relocate, villagers may 
adopt one or more of the following strategies (plus the increasingly difficult and dangerous 
option of seeking refuge in a neighbouring country) (Cusano, in Vincent & Sorensen 2001; 
HRW 2005; Field Notes passim): 
1. Hide in – or close to – zones affected by on-going armed conflict and forced 
relocation (with the hope of returning home, but often remaining mobile for years); 
2. Move to a relocation site; 
3. Enter a ceasefire area; 
4. Move to relatively more secure villages, towns or peri-urban areas, including ‘behind 
the front lines’ in war zones, in ceasefire zones, and in government-controlled 
locations. 
 
In many cases, civilians from the same community, subject to the same migration pressure 
(e.g. a relocation order), will adopt a variety of different responses (Field Notes). Indeed, this 
is often the case within an individual family: elderly folks may attempt to stay at home; 
adults will go into hiding in the jungle, enter a relocation site, or seek new livelihood options 
in relatively more secure and stable villages, towns or urban areas; while some children may 
be sent to join relatives in town.  
 
A displaced family or individual is more likely to adopt a life ‘in hiding’, in a zone of on-
going armed conflict, if they have some form of pre-established relationship with an armed 
opposition group – such as relatives already living in insurgent-controlled areas, or family or 
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friends in the KNU (for example). Similarly, Type 1 IDPs will tend to enter a ceasefire area, 
or relocation site, if they have non-threatening relations with the relevant ceasefire group, or 
government/ Tatmadaw authorities.  
 
 
CASE STUDY 2: KACHIN AND MON STATES 
 
Type 2: State-Society Conflict-Induced Displacement 
The case studies present mixed pictures of forced migration in Kachin and Mon States, since 
the agreement of ceasefires between the government and most insurgent groups in the mid-
1990s. Patterns of (Type 1) armed conflict-induced displacement have come to an end (with 
the exception of some parts of southern Mon State, which are subject to on-going armed 
conflict). This section focuses on post-ceasefire local, national and international 
rehabilitation and resettlement activities in Kachin and Mon States, and what lessons these 
responses might have for the future in Karen and other areas. 
 
Unfortunately, forced displacement has not come to an end in Kachin and Mon States, since 
the ceasefires. Over the past ten years, local communities have lost large amounts of land 
(and associated livelihoods), confiscated by the Tatmadaw, often in the context of its self-
support policy, and by local authorities and business groups, including in the context of 
‘development projects’, and due to unsustainable natural resource extraction. Furthermore, 
civilians in these areas continue to be subject to widespread forced labour, and other human 
rights abuses. These factors are all causes of on-going forced migration. 
 
Nevertheless, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Mon State Party (NMSP) 
and some other ceasefire groups, and their local civil society partners, have implemented a 
range of resettlement, rehabilitation and development programs, despite limited human and 
financial resources. More could have been achieved, with greater government and 
international (financial and capacity building) support. There has though, been a ‘peace 
dividend’ in Kachin and Mon States, and the post-ceasefire re-emergence of civil-society 
networks is particularly encouraging. 
 
As noted above, humanitarian conditions are generally better in ceasefire zones, than in 
government-controlled regions, relocation sites, or areas of on-going armed conflict. In 
general however, those who have benefited most from the ceasefires (villagers and 
community workers) have had the least ability to influence advocacy and political agendas – 
i.e. are denied ‘voice’. The advocacy literature regarding conditions in ceasefire areas is 
therefore rather distorted, and focuses disproportionately on negative developments. The lack 
of objective information and analysis makes it difficult for observers and actors to judge the 
desirability and prospects of ceasefires in areas of on-going armed conflict (e.g. Karen, 
Karenni and Southern Shan States). 
 
Political Context  
Between 1989 and 1995, ceasefire arrangements were brokered between General Khin 
Nyunt’s MI and a total of fifteen insurgent organisations (Smith 1999; South 2005). (At least 
a dozen local militias also agreed unofficial truces with the Burma Army during this period; 
these rarely had political agendas, beyond the maintenance of local autonomy). The 
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ceasefires are not peace treaties, and generally lack all but the most rudimentary 
accommodation of the ex-insurgents’ political and developmental demands.  
 
As Jake Sherman notes (in Sherman and Ballentine 2003, 241-42, 245): 
 
the ceasefires have improved physical security in some former combat zones. Still, promised 
political dialogue and economic development have not been forthcoming, and thus the deeper 
causes of conflict remain unaddressed. 
 
However, Sherman acknowledges that ceasefires do open space for basic economic 
development and that many ethnic minority organizations see this as a priority that is equal to 
that of democracy. He concludes that:  
 
“the ceasefires have been driven and maintained both by a desire to avoid conflict and its 
humanitarian impact, as well as by the economic self-interest of leaders from rival sides, for 
whom increased access to resource wealth is a key motivation for ceasing hostilities.”  
 
In most cases, the ex-insurgents have been allowed retain their arms, and have been granted 
de facto autonomy, and control of sometimes extensive blocks of territory. In some cases 
(e.g. the NMSP and KIO – see below), there is a clear demarcation between ceasefire group- 
and government-controlled territory; in the case of ceasefire groups which enjoy better 
relations with the government (e.g. the Pa-O National Organization: PNO), there is more 
overlap in zones of influence. 
 
The significance of the ceasefires is a contested subject. Positive and negative assessments 
are summarized below: 
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TABLE 3 – Ceasefires in Burma: Positive and Negative Developments  
 
Positive Post-ceasefire Developments  Negative Post-ceasefire Developments  
Positive assessments of the ‘ceasefire 
movement’ focus as much on process, as on the 
substance of short-middle term results. 
 
Following ceasefires, the Tatmadaw has generally 
expanded into previously contested zones (on the 
‘frontiers’ of demarcated ceasefire areas), 
increasing militarization, and undertaking 
widespread land confiscation, in the context of 
‘development projects’ (bridge, road, airport 
construction), and in order to fulfil the Tatmadaw’s 
self-support policy (leaders of some ceasefire 
groups have also confiscated village land). Causes 
forced migration (internal displacement).  
Relative decrease in most serious forms of 
human rights abuse (less murder, rape, torture, 
forced displacement – although incidents still 
occur), in those areas where ceasefires have 
held. Research indicates that humanitarian 
conditions are significantly better in ceasefire 
areas, than in government-controlled or war 
zones.  
Continuing incidence of forced labour and other 
human and civil rights abuses in areas adjacent to 
ceasefire zones. Also, resumption of acute human 
rights abuses in the two main areas where truces 
have broken down, and armed conflict 
recommenced (Karenni State and southern Mon 
State). Causes forced migration (internal 
displacement). 
Efforts to rehabilitate and resettle displaced 
populations, and reconstruct communities. 
Some successful community and economic 
development activities. If international donors 
had done more to support the KIO and other 
ceasefires, more could have been achieved.  
Chronically under-resourced welfare services. Lack 
of state and international assistance has often 
undermined local rehabilitation and development 
activities (although some beneficial projects have 
been carried out under the Border Areas 
Development Program). 
Expansion of indigenous language school and 
literacy programs, and the re-emergence of civil 
society networks within and between conflict-
affected communities – among the most 
significant (but under-appreciated) aspects of 
the social and political situation in Burma over 
the past decade. Civil society initiatives, 
building local participation in the education, 
community development and welfare sectors, 
are better established in some geographic areas 
(e.g. Mon and Kachin States), and among some 
socio-religious communities (e.g. Christians) 
than others; local capacities are often quite 
limited. 
Environmentally damaging and unsustainable 
natural resource extraction, by companies 
associated with government and ceasefire groups: 
logging (widespread), gold and jade mining 
(Kachin State).  
 
 Civilians who previously only had to pay tax to one 
(state or insurgent) group, have subsequently had to 
provide money, goods and services to both the 
Tatmadaw and one or more ceasefire groups. Such 
problems are particularly acute and widespread in 
areas where more than one (often predatory) 
ceasefire group has claims over the populace (e.g. 
in parts of north and south Shan State).  
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Positive Post-ceasefire Developments  Negative Post-ceasefire Developments  
 ‘Top-down’ political cultures, and lack of 
accountability, transparency and effective 
governance in many Special Region 
administrations (also a problem among non-
ceasefire groups, and in state agencies). 
Consolidation of opportunistic local power-holders 
(ceasefire group commanders, and their financial 
backers) whose motivation is primarily economic-
extractive, many of whom are involved in illegal 
drugs production and trafficking (or the protection 
and taxation thereof). 
 In many respects, the ‘ceasefire movement’ has 
frozen – rather than addressed – the socio-political 
issues structuring half a century of armed conflict 
in Burma. Lack of progress on the national political 
stage has been frustrating for the KIO in particular, 
as the prospect of political dialogue with Yangon 
was one of the key reasons for leaving the (KNU-
dominated) National Democratic Front/Democratic 
Alliance of Burma (NDF-DAB) alliance, and 
negotiating a ceasefire between 1992-94. 
 Recent moves by the government (and KIO) to 
restrict the activities of local NGOs and CBOs, in 
ceasefire and adjacent areas. 
 
 
Case Study Summary 
Following a ceasefire agreed with the government in 1994, the KIO oversaw the return of 
10,000 refugees from China, and helped to resettle about 60,000 IDPs within Kachin State 
(Field Notes and KIO reports). Although the KIO and local Kachin NGOs’ resettlement and 
reconstruction activities generally exhibited poor strategic and site planning (due to limited 
human and financial resources), they nevertheless implemented an impressive range of 
infrastructure and community development projects (Tosakul-Boonmathya 2002; Field Notes 
and KIO reports).  
 
The post-ceasefire re-emergence of civil-society networks in Kachin State over the past 
decade is particularly encouraging (South 2004). Today there are many more CBOs and local 
NGOs than before ceasefire – although the KIO remains ambivalent regarding the roles of 
civil society groups, and the government may be moving to further restrict the sector. Such 
local associations grow out of a war-ravaged population, and provide services to resettled 
IDPs and others, while slowly building local capacity (Heidel 2006). 
 
However, the post-ceasefire situation in Kachin State presents a mixed picture. The 
government’s attitude towards the Kachin and other ceasefire areas has been one of neglect – 
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or active obstruction.12 In the context of a KNU ceasefire several other negative 
developments present worrying precedents. Although, since 1993, there have been no ‘Four 
Cuts’-type forced relocations in Kachin State, communities continue to still loose their land 
especially due to the following developments (all citations from Field Notes; see also HRW 
2005):  
 
Post-ceasefire Military Occupation and Confiscation of Farmland. For example, before the 
ceasefire, there were four Tatmadaw battalions in Bhamo District, southern Kachin 
State; by 2004, there were eleven, each of which had reportedly confiscated 3–400 
acres of land. 
 
Natural Resource Extraction. Up to 4000 people have been displaced by large-scale jade 
mining around Phakant, western Kachin State. Increased post-ceasefire logging and 
gold mining activities have also brought environmental damage to several areas (as 
well as charges of corruption against ceasefire groups officials). 
 
Large-scale Agriculture and Development Projects. The state’s leasing of land to private 
companies often involves land confiscation, as does ‘development’-induced 
displacement – e.g. road, bridge and airport construction in the state capital of 
Myitkyina. 
 
All of these factors have been causes of continued forced migration since the ceasefire – i.e. 
people are still being displaced, although the reasons why have changed. In many cases, the 
abuses outlined above, particularly land loss and forced labour, undermine villagers’ 
livelihoods so severely, that they have little choice but to migrate, either within Burma, or to 
a neighbouring country (see further below on livelihoods/vulnerability-induced migration). 
 
The Mon State case study illustrates similar themes. Between 1993-96 – and especially after 
the 1995 NMSP ceasefire – about 10,000 Mon refugees were forced up to and across the 
border, by the Thai authorities. The Mon refugees were repatriated to NMSP-controlled 
ceasefire zones, with assistance from INGOs; UNHCR offered neither protection nor 
assistance (South 2005). 
 
Some refugees returned home, but most remained in limbo, in camp-like conditions just over 
the border, with only limited access to agricultural land. Although now largely ‘invisible’ to 
Thailand and the international community, few of the Mon returnees have actually returned 
home – but continue to face chronic livelihoods and food security problems, and remain 
partially dependant on decreasing amounts of humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, as a 
consequence of on-going human rights abuses (and renewed outbreaks of insurgency) in Mon 
State, newly displaced villagers continue to seek refuge in the Mon ceasefire zones and 
refugee resettlement sites.  
 
As in Kachin State, the most serious post-ceasefire problems in Mon State relate to housing, 
land and property rights: 
 
                                                
12
 Kachin leaders claim that the SPDC wants to keep their area under-developed, and undermine the KIO’s 
standing within Kachin communities: Authors Field Notes 
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Post-ceasefire Military Occupation and Confiscation of Farmland. Since 1998, more than 
11,000 acres of farmland have been confiscated by the Tatmadaw, mostly in order to 
build new garrisons in previously contested areas. Adding insult to injury, farmers 
have sometimes been forced to work on the confiscated land, building barracks and 
farming on behalf of the army (HURFOM 2003). 
 
’Development’-induced Displacement. This includes the government’s practice of building 
roads, bridges etc. on confiscated land, using conscripted labour.  
 
Nevertheless, there have also been positive developments in Mon State over the past decade. 
An end to the armed conflict has generally improved conditions of human security – at least 
in areas where the ceasefire has held. As in Kachin State, the ceasefires have brought new 
opportunities to develop agriculture, and opportunities for travel and local trade (especially 
important to villagers; less highly valued by exiles and political elites). In many villages, 
livelihoods have improved considerably over the past decade. 
 
Mon civil society has also seen impressive growth since the mid-1990s, as local NGOs and 
CBOs have implemented community development activities in the NMSP-controlled zones, 
and among Mon communities across lower Burma (cite your article here?). The NMSP-
administered education system has also accomplished a great deal during this period. Despite 
some serious setbacks, during the 2004–05 school year the party administered 187 Mon 
National Schools and 186 ‘mixed’ schools (shared with the state system), attended by nearly 
50,000 pupils, 70% of whom live in government-controlled areas and previously had no 
access to indigenous language education. 
 
Situation Update 
Since the purge of General Khin Nyunt and his relatively ‘progressive’ faction, in October 
2004, positive developments associated with the ceasefires have come under pressure from 
an increasingly ‘hard-line’ military government. (The ceasefire groups were among Khin 
Nyunt’s major clients; the existence of these agreements lent the ex-PM kudos and political 
power.)  
 
In April 2005 two (Shan and Palaung) ceasefire groups in northern Shan State were more-or-
less forcibly disarmed by the Tatmadaw, and transformed into government-controlled 
militias (HRW 2005). Observers and actors expect more ceasefires to come under pressure, 
as powerful regional army commanders restrict the space available to non-sate actors (Field 
Notes). A probable scenario is that, if/when the order to disarm comes from Yangon 
(possibly on conclusion of the on-going, government-controlled National Convention 
process, which is drawing up a new constitution for the country, in an attempt to 
institutionalize military rule: South 2004), elements of most ceasefire groups will comply, 
while some units will resume armed conflict.  
 
Type 2: Responses and Impacts 
Forced migrants’ vulnerabilities vary according to their response to displacement pressures. 
When villagers are forced to move, alongside the difficult and dangerous option of seeking 
refuge in neighbouring China or Thailand, they may adopt one or more of the following 
strategies: 
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1. Re-settle close to their original location; 
2. Move to a resettlement site (where one is provided); 
3. Move to relatively more secure villages, towns or peri-urban areas (ceasefire 
zones or government-controlled areas, and/or ‘mixed administration areas’). 
 
 
URBAN DISPLACEMENT (Type 2 Forced Migration) 
 
The large-scale forced relocation of urban populations in Burma has been practiced by 
governments since the 1950s. The practice has intensified since 1988-1990, when several 
hundred residents of Yangon and other cities were forcibly moved to outlying ‘satellite 
towns’. In late 2005, the SPDC ordered the relocation of Burma’s administrative capital, and 
military command-and-control centre, from Yangon to the central Burma hill town of 
Pyinmana, 400 Km to the north. Construction of Senior General Than Shwe’s new capital 
has reportedly displaced at least 10,000 local people, while thousands of government 
employees have been forced to move north, where living and working conditions are said to 
be Spartan at best. Urban displacement is considered a cause of Type 2 forced migration, as 
movement is forced (based on the threat or actual use of violence), and is often conducted in 
the name of ‘development’. 
 
Conditions, vulnerabilities and needs in ‘new villages’ vary, but are often similar to those in 
other government-controlled relocation sites. Also, like relocation site residents, many urban 
relocatees demonstrate great tenacity and resilience, in re-building their lives and 
communities in a new setting, under often very difficult circumstances. For people who 
relocate elsewhere (i.e. who do not move to the ‘new villages’), vulnerabilities and needs will 
be similar to those in other relatively stable areas. Urban relocatees also have similar 
protection needs to other Type 2 forced migrants, especially in the field of land and property 
rights.  
 
Local NGO and international agency programs with urban relocatees are mostly limited to 
some substitution and support activities, with occasional denunciatory advocacy conducted 
by non-Burma based groups. There are major gaps in both the data regarding urban 
relocation in Burma and its analysis. This in part explains the limited awareness of this as a 
protection issue among agencies ‘inside’ the country, and the subsequent lack of advocacy 
initiatives.  
 
 
LIVELIHOOD VULNERABILITY-INDUCED MIGRATION (Type 3 
Forced Migration) 
 
Type 3 (livelihoods insecurity-induced) internal migration is more widespread than the more 
acute types of forced migration in Burma (Types 1 and 2). Type 3 migrants are not ordered, 
or physically compelled to move, by the use or threat of force. However, the types of 
migration described below are forced, inasmuch as people generally have little or no 
meaningful choice, other than to move (there is little or no ‘option to remain’: see typology 
and discussion above). This type of movement may be referred to as ‘distress migration’ or 
‘migration for survival’. Type 3 forced migrants therefore constitute a particularly vulnerable 
sub-group of the larger ‘economic migrant’ population. 
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The limited available evidence suggests that both temporary (seasonal and ‘commuting’) and 
permanent migration are on the increase in Burma. The type of periphery-centre population 
movement described here often increases following the agreement of ceasefires between the 
state and insurgent groups. During periods of armed conflict, travel in rural areas is usually 
difficult and dangerous, while the political economies of war, and control over civilian 
populations, are priorities for combatants on all sides. (As noted above, the state has pursued 
a policy of forcibly relocating civilians in war zones, while insurgent groups often encourage 
‘their’ people to stay put, or to retreat behind the ‘front lines’ of conflict). Following the 
cessation of hostilities, civilians often exploit the new movement opportunities brought by 
relative peace.  
 
Push and Pull Factors. Among the very large (but un-quantified) number of ‘economic 
migrants’, who move primarily because of ‘pull factors’, are a sub-group, whose migration is 
to a significant degree determined by ‘push factors’. Obviously, the patterns of abuse and 
displacement associated with forced migration Types 1 and 2 undermine livelihoods, often 
leading eventually to migration. Other ‘push factors’ include natural disaster (floods and 
tsunami, fires etc.), population pressure, soil depletion and land fragmentation, and the 
impossibility of sustaining family livelihoods in remote areas. The proximate causes of ‘Type 
3’ migration are human insecurity, lack of access to education and health services, and poor 
access to markets for local produce. The roots causes are structured by decades of poor 
governance, and the underdevelopment of remote, ethnic nationality-populated (often 
conflict-affected) border areas.  
 
People also move to access labour markets. Although attitudes in the mainstream 
development industry are sometimes negative – and programs often aim to reduce migration 
– for many of those involved, internal migration is an important coping and livelihood 
strategy, which can lead to the accumulation of household wealth.  
 
Type 3: Responses and Impact. Migrants’ vulnerabilities – and consequent needs – vary 
according to the phase of migration:  
1. Pre-migration phase, and remaining inhabitants; 
2. Migrants in transit (including to neighbouring countries); 
3. Migrants in peri-urban and urban areas. 
 
Opium Eradication and Displacement in the Kokang Special Region  
Migration due to opium eradication programs is categorized as Type 3 forced migration 
(‘distress migration’), because the proximate causes of movement are related to livelihoods 
issues – i.e. with the important exception of some Wa areas, people are not ordered to move. 
However, opium eradication-induced migration could also be considered under Type 2 
forced migration, due to the forcible nature of the opium bans, the severe shock to 
livelihoods involved, and the links to development activities. As people who have “been 
forced or obliged … to leave their homes … as a result of … human-made disasters” they 
may be considered IDPs according to the Guiding Principles. 
 
The third case study focuses on the situation in the Kokang Special Region 1, a ceasefire 
zone controlled by the ex-CPB National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – but 
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strongly (and increasingly) influenced by the Tatmadaw. Following a 1989 ceasefire with the 
government, the Kokang ceasefire zone underwent an economic boom (and considerable in-
migration from China), as a result of increased opium harvests and heroin refining activities, 
from which both the MNDAA and regional Tatmadaw commanders benefited financially 
(even if most were not involved directly). The local Kokang and other ethnic minority 
communities also benefited somewhat from the ‘opium boom’ of the 1990s. However, most 
villagers remained very poor, and grew opium poppy only to fill a rice deficit of (in many 
cases) up to nine months per year, caused by the poor growing conditions for paddy in the 
steep Kokang hills (Field Notes: UN sources).  
 
In 1997 the MNDAA announced a ban on growing and processing opium. This was due to a 
combination of national (government) and international (Chinese and UN) pressure – and the 
example of drugs-free development in neighbouring China. Although initially unsuccessful, 
by 2002 the ban had been implemented across much of Kokang.  
 
Responses and Impacts. The opium ban resulted in farmers’ incomes dropping by an average 
of 70%, leading to extreme livelihoods and human security shocks (Field Notes: UN 
sources). Strangely, the humanitarian crisis produced by the poppy ban was unforeseen by 
the Kokang or SPDC authorities – or by their main development partner, the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), whose buckwheat crop substation plan had clearly 
failed by 2002 (though the agency has provided some useful infrastructure). 
 
Plummeting standards of living have led to health and nutrition crises, and caused high 
school drop-out rates, as well a having serious environmental impacts. The humanitarian 
crisis caused extensive (mostly non-voluntary) out-migration, to China and the Wa ceasefire 
areas (where villagers could continue to grow poppy, for a while at least). One third of the 
population reportedly migrated from Sri in 2003, after the opium ban (60,000 people, out of 
an estimated population of 180-200,000: Field Notes). 
 
Protection Issues. The steep, and relatively densely-populated, hillsides of Kokang are ideally 
suited to poppy cultivation. However, even for those who own land, it seems unlikely that 
this terrain could support more than 6-9 months of rice needs.  
 
The future looks particularly bleak for the 20-30% of the ceasefire zone population who are 
not ethnic Kokang. Few Palaung, Miao and Lisu villagers own their own fields, having 
previously worked as day labourers for Kokang villagers, and/or Chinese and other opium 
entrepreneurs. These communities are finding it particularly difficult to switch to alternative 
livelihoods (Field Notes). 
 
In the event of humanitarian aid being withdrawn13, a significant proportion of the population 
will have little choice but to leave Kokang. It seems likely that most migrants would come 
from the marginalized and especially vulnerable non-Kokang communities. The primary 
protection issue in Kokang therefore relates to the vulnerability to forced migration of local 
(especially non-Kokang) populations – which could alter the ethnic make-up of the region.  
                                                
13
 In 2003 the UN World Food Program started emergency food distributions in Kokang. With a proposed 
budget of $8 million, the agency plans to assist 347,600 people in Shan State during 2005-06. A number of 
other international and local agencies have projects in the Kokang and other ex-opium producing areas of Shan 
State. 
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If lessons are not learned from Kokang, the impacts of the opium ban – and resulting 
vulnerabilities – are likely to be reproduced in United Wa State Party (UWSA)-controlled 
zones and elsewhere. One by-product of opium eradication policies in Wa areas has already 
been the forcible relocation of at least 50,000 villagers (probably more), from opium growing 
areas in the northern Wa sub-state (Jelsma, Kramer and Vervest 2005; Field Notes). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has focussed on some crucial, but generally overlooked, aspects of forced 
migration in Burma, including the phenomenon of serial displacement. Many IDPs and 
others move repeatedly, sometimes for a combination of different reasons (i.e. a mixture of 
the ‘ideal’ Types 1-3); others have been displaced for some time, and have found at least 
semi-durable solutions to their plight; many are living inter-mixed with communities who are 
not – or have not recently been – displaced.  
 
Forced migrants’ needs can only be assessed, and appropriate interventions planned, if the 
full complexity of displacement situations in Burma are understood. Humanitarian (and 
political) actors should therefore respect, and respond to, the voice and agency of forced 
migrants, and enrol their participation in all aspects of program planning and implementation.  
 
In most cases, forced migrants, and communities threatened by displacement, have distinct 
vulnerabilities and special protection needs related to the causes of migration (especially 
armed and state-society conflict). These concerns link humanitarian needs to explicitly 
political issues.  
 
Effective conflict resolution in Burma must address underlying issues, which have structured 
decades of conflict in the country. However, it is not necessary to wait for political solutions 
before addressing the needs outlined in this paper. The acute humanitarian crises faced by 
IDPs and other forced migrant populations in Burma demands immediate action.  
 
The Need for Effective Protection 
The presence of international and local agencies in conflict-affected and other parts of Burma 
presents opportunities to assist vulnerable populations.14 However, humanitarian assistance is 
                                                
14
 The period from November 2003 to September 2004 saw the rapid opening of humanitarian space in Burma. 
Unfortunately, since the October 2004 demise of Khin Nyunt, and subsequent purge of his MI establishment, 
the extent of humanitarian space in the country has begun to constrict. Nevertheless, the situation in early/mid-
2006, although less favorable than in 2004, is still better than in 2000–02. The recent overall decline in the 
quality and amount of ‘humanitarian space’ available in Burma is reflected in a set of draft Guidelines for UN 
Agencies, International Organizations and NGO/INGOs on Cooperation Program in Burma, produced by the 
Prime Minister’s office in February 2006. Among the more worrying proposals included in these Guidelines are 
the suggestion that the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development should accompany UN and 
INGO staff on all field trips; the proposed supervisory roles to be played by Central and State-Divisional 
Coordinating Committees; and the government’s plan to vet Burmese national UN and INGO staff. If the 
Guidelines are implemented as presently drafted, it seems likely that many international aid operations in 
Burma will be forced to cease (as has already been the case with the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis – although in this case, there were additional, politically-driven consideration behind the decision 
to withdraw). Indeed, in February 2006 MSF-France quit Burma, claiming that increased government 
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not a substitute for protection, and humanitarian access is not in itself sufficient to ensure 
protection. In order to be effective, protection activities must be devised as part of a coherent 
and conscious strategy (Hugo and Bonwick 2005). One of the greatest challenges facing 
international agencies in Burma is how to achieve a dynamic balance between short- and 
longer-term assistance interventions, while keeping a focus on protection concerns. 
 
By employing a range of strategies – including supporting the practices of affected 
communities, and local NGOs and CBOs – it is often possible to address protection concerns, 
in the process of meeting other basic needs. As well as providing services (directly or 
through local structures), the range of protection activities includes ‘securing compliance’ 
with international norms, by state and other armed groups.  
 
One of the main types of action required to stop abuse (or its recurrence) is advocacy. 
Humanitarian advocacy aims at protecting civilians from – or alleviating the impacts of – 
abuse, and falls under three broad modes: denunciation, mobilization and persuasion 
(‘responsibalization’). Some agencies – primarily human rights-oriented groups based 
outside the country – rightly denounce the violation of basic rights involved in forced 
displacement, and call for fundamental changes in Burma (i.e. appropriate conflict 
resolution), or at least radically improved behaviour on the part of the state and armed 
groups. However, in most cases, their recommendations have been rather general, with few 
attempts to seriously consider what might be achieved in practice.  
 
The production of large volumes of public advocacy material has prompted some 
international agencies operating inside Burma to acknowledge the protection deficit in many 
areas, and become more pro-active in attempting to address these concerns. However, 
organizations working inside the country cannot afford to be as bold in their advocacy roles 
as those in Thailand and overseas. They have sometimes adopted more subtle strategies, of 
attempting to persuade perpetrators to change their behaviour – or using their access to 
conflict areas, and awareness of human rights abuses, to ‘mobilize’ those agencies operating 
in persuasive or denunciation modes. For example, CBOs ‘inside’ Burma may pass on 
human rights information to their local and international counterparts in Thailand or 
elsewhere. There is evidence that the existence of such ‘protection and advocacy networks’ 
has served to reduce the incidence of human rights abuses in some parts of Karen and 
Karenni States. 
 
Indirect and behind-the-scenes advocacy are areas where UN agencies, INGOs and the ICRC 
in Burma have made some progress in the past few years. Action at the national level has in 
many cases been reflected in genuine cooperation ‘on the ground’, between some state and 
UN agencies, and local and international NGOs. Behind-the-scenes advocacy with national, 
state and local authorities has helped to build a more ‘protective environment’ – especially in 
the fields of HIV/AIDS and harm reduction, and human trafficking and child rights. Efforts 
should be made to strengthen and extended such models to other areas. 
 
This would involve international agencies in policy discussions with government (and 
ceasefire group) authorities, on governance and reform in a range of sectors – e.g. sustainable 
                                                                                                                                                    
restrictions had made its operations in Mon and Karen States untenable. (As MSF avoids working with local 
structures, and thus does little to build local capacities, it was ill-prepared to operate in an increasingly 
constricted humanitarian environment.) 
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rural development (including in the context of opium eradication in Shan State); agriculture, 
taxation and livelihoods policies; and the provision of health and education services in 
remote areas. Efforts should also be made to expand engagement on better governance to 
cover legal issues, such as the development of enhanced standards of – and respect for – 
individual and community land and property rights.15 
 
The ICRC’s ‘protective presence’, in those areas of on-going armed conflict to which the red 
cross has access, is reportedly very effective. However, most other international (and 
especially UN) agencies in Burma undertake only limited advocacy activities on behalf of 
forced migrants.  
 
Collaborative protection activities can sometimes be undertaken in partnership between 
international and local organizations. Civil society groups in Burma are often present in 
remote, conflict-affected areas, but rarely have access to the ‘corridors of power’. In contrast, 
international agencies cannot always reach populations with the most acute needs, but do 
have access to a range of national and international powerholders. It is therefore important 
that international agencies continue to develop dialogue and partnerships with appropriate 
civil society networks in Burma. 
 
Durable Solutions, and Rehabilitation 
Substantial and sustained protection from forced migration, and the rehabilitation of 
displaced populations and reconstruction of communities, depend ultimately on settlements 
to the conflicts which cause displacement in Burma. Unfortunately, efforts at conflict 
resolution have met with only limited success.  
 
As noted, humanitarian, development and political actors’ ability to understand long-term 
patterns of forced migration in Burma are particularly important, given the evidence from 
Kachin and Mon States that conflict and displacement may not come to an end with the 
cessation of insurgency. These findings should alert local, national and international agencies 
to the fact that civilians in supposedly ‘post-conflict’ settings in Burma experience 
continuing humanitarian (including protection) needs.  
 
Nevertheless, the Mon and Kachin case studies illustrate the range of projects than can be 
implemented by local authorities (ceasefire groups) and civil society (CBOs and local 
NGOs), in the context of less-than-ideal ceasefires, in previously armed conflict-affected 
areas. More might have been (and still might be) achieved, with greater support from the 
government and international agencies.  
 
As noted above, since a provisional ceasefire was agreed between the government and KNU, 
the situation in some Karen areas has begun to stabilize. Across parts of lower and western 
Karen State, there is less fighting, and fewer acute human rights violations than before. 
However, civilians are still subject to a range of abuses, including new problems similar to 
those experienced post-ceasefire in Kachin and Mon States. 
 
                                                
15
 Displaced people have ‘a right to a remedy’, as recognized in the Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Person (UNHCR 2005). 
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These developments raise the subject of displaced people’s rehabilitation, including issues of 
resettlement and return. The primary concern relates to ‘durable solutions’ – both political 
settlements, and aid interventions which link relief and development. 
 
Due to the prevalence of refugee-oriented mindsets, humanitarian and political strategists 
often assume that most IDPs will want to go home (the equivalent of refugee repatriation – 
but without the legal protection element). However, the primary research cautions against 
such assumptions: at least some (Type 1 and other) forced migrants may prefer to remain in 
situ – especially if their concerns for physical security are adequately addressed. Other 
displaced people will want to resettle elsewhere – either returning home, or moving to a new 
location – especially if sustainable solutions are found to long-running armed and state-
society conflicts in Burma. 
 
The ‘durable solution’ of local integration may allow IDPs to escape cycles of displacement, 
and begin to re-build their lives. Whether they want to stay in their present settlement, or 
return to a previous place (which may, or may not, constitute ‘home’16) will in part depend 
on IDPs’ current degree of livelihoods and human security in situ (i.e. whether they have 
found at least semi-durable solutions to their plight). Another important factor in the decision 
will be their knowledge of what has happened to their old homes, land and other property, 
and whether these have since been occupied – by the state or Tatmadaw (or other armed 
group), by private commercial interests (often linked to state or para-state agencies), or by 
other civilians (quite possibly, other IDPs). As in refugee repatriation, the principle of 
informed voluntariness should be central to any decisions regarding solutions to internal 
displacement in Burma.  
 
 
                                                
16
 A recent publication (Vincent and Sorensen 2001, p. 266) suggests that “studying displaced people’s longer-
term strategies of mobility and locality will help humanitarian organisations to avoid basing their assistance on 
false assumptions about ‘home’ and ‘belonging’…. [Such an approach] should underscore the importance of 
designing actions not according to preconceived notions, but according to the way internally displaced persons 
live their lives, in all their complexity.” 
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